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SCOFIELO*

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has decided that the ques
tion of whether physician-assisted suicide should be against the law
is one of the most important legal, ethical, and moral1 questions
confronting patients who are struggling to live and die, and physi
cians who are struggling to practice medicine in our health care sys
tem. 2 As the Quinlan 3 and the Cruzan 4 cases once captured our
attention, so have the physician-assisted suicide cases grabbed the
headlines this year. Presumably, if anyone has anything to say
about this issue, now is the time to speak, or to forever hold one's
peace.
Although I am grateful to again have the opportunity to say
something about the legalization of physician-assisted suicide,S I
honestly do not know what is left to be said. So much has been
written, and so many people have spoken to the issue that, like
• Associate Professor of Community Medicine, University of Connecticut School
of Medicine. A.B., Princeton University; J.D., New York University School of Law.
Thanks to Heather Gunas, a student pursuing a law degree at the University of Con
necticut School of Law and an M.P.H. degree at the University of Connecticut School
of Medicine, for her research support, and to Kramer Scofield for his unique support.
1. For a discussion of the differences between law, morals, and ethics, see Geof
frey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 447 (1995).
2. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997);
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Wash
ington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997).
3. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
4. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
5. For my earlier remarks, see Giles R. Scofield, Exposing Some Myths About
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATn.E U. L. REv. 473 (1995); Giles R. Scofield, Pri
vacy (or Liberty) and Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAIN & SYMPI'OM MOMT. 280 (1991).
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Debbie, I very much feel like saying, "Let's get it over with."6
More than that, I am more convinced than ever before that
saying anything will not matter, for the simple reason that we have
lost the ability to listen to and converse with one another.7 We
seem to suffer from a peculiar kind of locked-in syndrome, so con
vinced that we are right that we see little point in taking seriously
the possibility that we might be wrong. Not only do we seem no
longer capable of hearing one another, we seem incapable of hear
ing patients as well. But since we know what is right, and know
what patients must or should want, we plod ahead on our respective
missions. Yet, if the choice we face is to converse or perish,s our
inability and unwillingness to converse9 suggests that more is at
stake than the undue killing of patients, significant though that is
sue is in its own right. Although I suspect that what I have to say
will fall on deaf ears, I intend to speak as plainly and directly as I
can.
To some, this occasion probably seems to offer me a golden
opportunity: the chance to say and write something that might
make a difference. Perhaps a Supreme Court clerk, or even a
Supreme Court Justice will read this lO and decide that I deserve
honorable mention in any of the several opinions likely to accom
pany the Court's decision in these historic cases. Unfortunately,
such a perspective reflects a belief about mortality and immortality
that is as common as it is mistaken (Le., that the successful pursuit
of money, power, material goods, or, in this instance, fame, can and
will enable one to overcome the dread of having lived an insignifi
cant life).11 This is the perspective held by those who fear mortal
6.
7.

It's over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272, 272 (1988).
See Giles R. Scofield, Before the Dying Begins, 9 TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE,
LAW & ETHICS 11 (1994). In this I am hardly alone. See JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, DEMOC·
RACY ON TRIAL (1995); CliIusTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE
BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY (1995); ROBERT D. PuTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY
WORK: CIVIC TRADmONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Fr. Robert J. Araujo, S.J., Hu
manitarian Jurisprudence: The Quest for Civility, 40 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 715 (1996).
8. See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LEGISLATORS AND INTERPRETERS: ON MODERNITY,
POST-MODERNITY AND INTELLECTUALS 143 (1987).
9. See MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLmCAL
DISCOURSE (1991); JAMES D. HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING BEGINS: SEARCHING
FOR DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA'S CuLTURE WAR (1994); JAMES D. HUNTER, CuLTURE
WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
10. Of course, if they truly wish to understand my meaning, they have to do some
listening too. See infra note 76.
11. See ERNEST BECKER, EscAPE FROM EVIL (1975); ERNEST BECKER, THE DE·
NIAL OF DEATH (1973).
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ity. Hence, it is the very perspective that gives rise to the anxious
need to dominate death, to get death to obey our will, and to avoid
the grip death has on us.
This being the case, it would be hypocritical for me to adopt a
death-denying perspective in the course of condemning the death
defying response that I believe physician-assisted suicide to be. Be
cause I think about mortality12 and immortality-my own and
others'-from an altogether different perspective,13 I speak and
write for an altogether different purpose: which is not to praise phy
sician-assisted suicide, but to bury it.
From my perspective, that we are even discussing this issue this
year suggests how easily distracted we are, and how deluded we
have become. 14 Given all that we possibly can and arguably should
be talking and doing something about, we remain obsessed with dis
cussing, and fixated on doing something about, the one fact of life
that we cannot change: our mortality.1S For some absurd reason,
we pursue the impossible instead of the possible, intent on doing
something about death instead of making something of life. 16 As a
result, we have embroiled ourselves in a Lilliputian, but nonetheless
lethal, debate about whether we should legalize individualized mur
der.17 We have managed to avoid discussing the far more pressing
12. Simply stated, knowing full well that one day I shall be dead, I only hope that
'my death comes not a moment too soon, nor a moment too late. I know and accept,
however, that the likelihood of my dying where, how, and when I wish, is completely a
matter of chance. This being the case, then, however understandable it might be for me
to obsess about whether death will tum out to be my enemy or my friend, I know that
death just is, regardless of what I interpret it to be.
The interpretation of and the significance we assign to death affects how we re
spond, individually and societally, to death, and to the nagging knowledge that each of
us one day will die. These perceptions about the reality of death perfuse any and all
discussions of death, in ways that can and often do escape our individual and collective
consciousness. See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MORTALITY, IMMORTALITY AND OTHER LIFE
STRATEGIES 129-60 (1992); see also Giles R. Scofield, Lost and (Not Yet) Found, 8 HEC
FORUM 372 (1996). For this reason, much of this article will focus on how we interpret
death, with an eye to enhancing our understanding of the current situation.
13. See BAUMAN, supra note 12; ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIFE IN FRAGMENTS: Es
SAYS IN POSTMODERN MORTALITY (1995); ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND AM
BNALENCE (1991); ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, POSTMODERN ETHICS (1993); HANS JONAS,
MORTALITY AND MORALITY: A SEARCH FOR THE GOOD AFTER AUSCHWITZ (Law
rence Vogel ed., 1996).
14. See BAUMAN, supra note 12, at 129-60; SCOFIELD, supra note 12, passim.
15. See HANS JONAS, The Burden and Blessing of Mortality, in MORTALITY AND
MORALITY, supra note 13, at 87-98.
16. See ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS (1955) (proposing a solution to
the problem of suicide); ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL (1969) (proposing a solution to
the problem of murder).
17. For a patient's story of struggle with life and death, see Timothy E. Quill,
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issue of whether we should condemn as immoral and illegal a health
care system that commits mass murder in the name of economic
apartheid.18
For this reason, I have no intention of employing the frame
work commonly used to analyze the legalization of physician-as
sisted suicide,19 but intend instead to suggest three possibilities for
your consideration. They are: (1) that the legalization of physician
assisted suicide is not and cannot be what it purports to be; (2) that
the legalization of physician-assisted suicide is and can only be
something that it should not be; and (3) that the movement to legal
ize physician-assisted suicide is not what it should be. In so doing, I
intend to cast doubt on the following beliefs: (1) that the legaliza
tion of physician-assisted suicide is the ineluctable result of a logi
cal, consistent application of existing law; (2) that the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide empowers patients; and (3) that the
movement to legalize assisted suicide, as well as the movement to
resist its legalization, is a legally and morally progressive response
to our mortal condition.
I. THE

LEGALIZATION OF PHYSICIAN-AsSISTED SUICIDE Is NOT
AND CANNOT BE WHAT IT PURPORTS TO BE

Rhetorically, the argument in favor of legalizing physician-asDeath and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED.
691 (1991).
18. Although this may seem to be a rather strong, if not an altogether outrageous
statement, it is consistent with the logic used by those who advocate the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide. One of the reasons given for relaxing the prohibition against
murder (assisted suicide is a form of murder) is that decisions to forgo life-sustaining
treatment are a kind of legalized killing. The point being, since we are already engaged
in murder, why not do so openly and honestly? If that is taken to be the truth, then it
must be as true for decisions to withhold as it is for decisions to withdraw treatment,
since they are legally and ethically equivalent. And if that is true, then to the extent
that Americans die more quickly than they otherwise would have because they lack
access to care, we are engaged in mass murder, a kind of involuntary, passive euthana
sia. If that is so, I think it makes more sense to halt the mass murder that we are
engaged in than to permit individualized killing that is currently prohibited.
19. For a discussion of the commonly used framework, see Joseph J. Fins & Mat
thew D. Bacchetta, Framing the Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Active Eutha
nasia Debate: The Role ofDeontology, Consequentialism, and Clinical Pragmatism, 43 J.
AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 563 (1995). For a discussion of "breaking" the frame, see ER
VING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN EssAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE
345-77 (1986). For a discussion of why we ought to break the frame, see ZYGMUNT
BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST (1989); BAUMAN, supra note 12, at 129
60. For a discussion of why we are unlikely to break the frame any time in the near
future, see Scofield, supra note 12, passim.
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sisted suicide20 proceeds with all the intellectual rigor of a Madison
Avenue advertising campaign. "If you hate pain and suffering, and
you like liberty, you'll love physician-assisted suicide. It takes the
muss, the fuss, and the wait out of dying. No more nasty machines.
No more waiting for death. Now you can make death happen
instantly! Call your doctor today. You'll be glad you did." The fact
that so many Americans seem to be demanding this technological
quick fix must mean something.21 What that something is, of
course, is a matter of interpretation.22
Legally, physician-assisted suicide is said to be the ineluctable
product23 of reasoning that underlies two distinct, but related,
20. Because there is no need to refer to everything physician-assisted suicide's
advocates have said or written in order to get a sense of their perspective, I will limit
myself to a representative sampling of recent forays into this area. See Tom L.
Beauchamp, The Justification of Physician-Assisted Deaths, 29 IND. L. REv. 1173
(1996); Howard Brody, Assisted Death: A Compassionate Response to a Medical Fail
ure, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1384 (1992); Quill, supra note 17; Robert F. Weir, The
Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 20 J.L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 116 (1992); Rob
ert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Hastening Inevitable Death, HASTINGS CrR. REp.,
Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 20.
21. For a discussion of physician-assisted suicide from both patients' and physi
cians' perspectives, see Robert J. Blendon et aI., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in
Dying? The Public Perspective, 267 JAMA 2658 (1992); Christine K. Cassel, The Popu
lar Movement for Physician-Assisted Dying-What the Public is Saying, What Physi
cians are Hearing, 157 W.J. MED. 191 (1992); Faith Fitzgerald, Physician Aid in Dying
Finding the Middle Ground, 157 W.J. MED. 193 (1992); Faye J. Girsh, Physician Aid in
Dying: What Physicians Say, What Patients Say, 157 W.J. MED. 188 (1992); Albert R.
Jonsen, Death, Politics and Philosophy, 157 W.J. MED. 192 (1992); Paul K. Longmore,
Assisted Suicide-What Euthanasia Activists Say, What People with Disabilities Say, 157
W.J. MED. 190 (1992).
22. See Yale Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Why These Reasons are Not Convincing, 12 ISSUES L. & MED. 113 (1996).
In order to know what to make of these data we need to know a few things. First, we
need to know what the pollsters were looking for, and how they decided to write the
questions. Then, we need to know how the respondents to these polls interpreted the
questions. For all we know, they were asked one thing, and answered another. Third,
we need to know whose interpretation of these polls matters, and why. Having briefly
represented a polling organization, I recall the cautionary phrase bandied about among
pollsters: "Figures don't lie, but liars can figure." Before dismissing this aphorism as so
much cynicism, consider this editorial response to the recently published data concern
ing the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. "As with the 1990 study from the
Netherlands, ... both sides in the American debate will most likely claim that the
findings support their position as the controversy intensifies and the matter comes
before our highest court." Marcia Angell, Euthanasia in the Netherlands-Good News
or Bad?, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1676, 1678 (1996); see also, Paul J. van der Maas et aI.,
Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other Medical Practices Involving the End
of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1699 (1996); Gerrit van
der Wal et aI., Evaluation of the Notification Procedure for Physician-Assisted Death in
the Netherlands, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706 (1996).
23. The most basic values that support and guide all health care decision making,
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strands of case law: abortion and the treatment refusal cases.24 As
suming arguendo that following premises to their logical conclusion
is never wrong,25 is the argument as logically correct as advocates of
physician-assisted suicide say it is?
H we stick to simple logic, we encounter the immediate diffi
culty of deriving a right to physician-assisted suicide from the treat
ment refusal cases. There is an inherent logical fallacy in deriving a
positive right to physician-assisted suicide from the negative right
on which the treatment refusal cases rest. 26 Regardless of whether
one approaches the question legally, philosophically, or mathemati
cally, one cannot simply derive a positive from a negative. That we
have a right to be let alone does not mean that we have the right to
be aided. A right not to have something done to you does not cre
ate a right to have things done for youP Thus, the mere fact that
including decisions about life-sustaining treatment, are the same values that
provide the fundamental basis for physician-assisted suicide: promoting pa
tients' well-being and respecting their self-determination or autonomy .
. . . [M]aking physician-assisted suicide available to patients who choose it
is not a radical departure in medical practice or public policy, but a natural
and appropriate extension of presently accepted practices.
Charles H. Baron et aI., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 33 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1,4-5 (1996).
24. See Sylvia A. Law, PhysiCian-Assisted Death: An Essay on Constitutional
Rights and Remedies, 55 MD. L. REv. 292 (1996).
25. I do not share this assumption. "Logic relentlessly and inappropriately pur
sued to its end can as readily lead to destructive results as can muddled emotions."
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 70 (1978).
26. The distinction between the two rights is nicely drawn by Professors
Chervenak and McCullough:
Refusal of medical intervention is a negative right simpliciter . ...
A negative right is usually understood in ethics as a right of noninterfer
ence in decision-making and behavior. A negative right therefore generates
duties on the part of others to leave the individual in question alone. . . . By
contrast, positive rights involve a claim on the resources of others to have
some need, desire, or want met.
Frank A. Chervenak & Laurence B. McCullough, Justified Limits on Refusing Interven
tion, HASTINGS CrR. REp., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 12, 12 (endnote omitted).
27. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDI
CAL E1HIcs 72-73 (4th ed. 1994); BART J. CoLLOPY, THE CoNCEPTUALLY PROBLEM
ATIC STATUS OF AUTONOMY: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE RETIREMENT RESEARCH
FOUNDATION 143-48 (1986). Judge Noonan seems to integrate this distinction into his
discussion of physician-assisted suicide. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49
F.3d 586, 590-94 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. Ed.
2d 772 (1997); see also ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR EsSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1975); PRESI
DENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED. AND
BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: REPORT ON THE ETHI
CAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTI
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we have decided that physicians must or should exercise forbear
ance when it comes to decisions about life-sustaining treatment
does not, without more, warrant the conclusion that they must or
should prescribe life-ending medication upon request. 28
After all, if patients did have positive rights to health care, ac
cess to health care would not be such a problem.29 If citizens did
TIONER RELATIONSHIP 45-46 (1982); Judith Ross & Neil Wenger, Institutional Ethics:
Hospital Practices and Policies for Denying Life-Sustaining Treatment, 15 WHI'ITIER L.
REv. 33, 34-35 (1994); LAW REFORM CoMM'N OF CANADA, EU1HANASIA, AIDING SUI.
CIDE AND CEssATION OF TREATMENT 20-28 (1983).
28. "When a patient seeks to exercise a positive right to an intervention, a neces
sary condition is that there is either an established or a theoretical medical basis for that
patient's request." Allan S. Brett & Laurence B. McCullough, When Patients Request
Specific Interventions: Defining the Limits of the Physician's Obligation, 315 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1347,1349 (1986).
This fatal flaw in the logic of their position does not prevent physician-assisted
suicide's advocates from asserting that their position is both solid and consistent. Thus,
one often hears them assert that a decision to withdraw treatment is "assisting" a pa
tient to die, because a physician has to do something, provide some manner of assist
ance, in order for the patient's right to die to be honored. See Thomas A. Preston,
Physician Involvement in Life-Ending Practices, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 531, 536-38
(1995) (stating that the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment does not harm or "de
prive of life" when life is almost gone); Kathryn L. Thcker & David J. Burman, Physi
cian Aid in Dying: A Humane Option, a Constitutionally Protected Choice, 18 SEAITLE
U. L. REv. 495, 502-04 (1995) (concluding that the basic rights of liberty, privacy, and
self-determination are equally invaded by hastening inevitable death with medical
assistance and refusing unwanted medical treatment). The Ninth Circuit embraced this
interpretation as well. See Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590-94. This amounts to
the same thing as saying that when a trespasser walks off private property at the land
owner's request, he or she has lent positive assistance to or "helped" the distressed
landowner to halt a trespass, and not simply done what is necessary to cease violating
the landowner's rights. It is easy to demonstrate the flaw inherent in equating decisions
to forgo treatment with physician-assisted suicide. The law already holds that decisions
to withhold treatment and decisions to withdraw treatment are legally and ethically
equivalent. That being the case, if physician-assisted suicide is the same as a decision to
forgo treatment, then it is as much the equivalent of a decision to withhold as it is a
decision to withdraw treatment. To believe that, one has to believe that a patient who
dies without ever having been medicated dies in a manner that is legally and ethically
no different from a patient who dies as the result of having been "over-medicated." In
short, one has to believe that a patient who dies of natural causes dies in a manner that
is legally and ethically the same as a patient who dies of a drug overdose.
If that is true, then two things also must be true. Hrst, for as long as human beings
have been dying of natural and accidental causes, they have in fact been dying just as
they would have, had assisted suicide been available. Second, in order to die a good
death right now, one need only deny oneself access to health care. That being the case,
physician-assisted suicide's advocates must believe that Americans who die for want of
care are dying "good" deaths. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
29. See BEAUCHAMP & CmLoRESS, supra note 27, at 148-68; 1 PREsIDENT'S
CoMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF EnuCAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED. AND BEHAV
IORAL REsEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 32-35 (1983) (citing Harris v.
McRae,448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) as support
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have a right to health care, we would be sorting out who gets what
treatment from the array of health care options society has decided
its members deserve, instead of watching the numbers of those
without access to care grow steadily, and hearing stories about
those who thought they were covered find that all they possess is
"virtual" access to care.30 It is, therefore, as incongruous for physi
cian-assisted suicide's advocates to be asserting that Americans al
ready have rights to health care as it is odd for them to be saying
that the first such right Americans want and need is the right to life
ending medication. 31 Not only is this an odd way of thinking about
health policy, it is an odd way of interpreting what patients are
saying.32
That there is no such thing as a right to health care is equally
for the proposition that there is no constitutional right to health care); see also INSTI
TUTE OF MED., CoMMITTEE ON MONITORING ACCESS TO PERSONAL HEALTH CARE
SERVS., ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (Michael Millman ed., 1993). As one
advocate for the rights of patients succinctly puts it, "Is there a legal right to health care
in the United States? No." GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 13 (2d ed.
1989).
30. Wendy K. Mariner, Liability for Managed Care Decisions: The Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Uneven Playing Field, 86 AM. J. PuB.
HEALTH 863 (1996) (discussing how ERISA enables health care plans to deny benefits
with relative impunity). It is difficult to know which is more worrisome, the medicaliza
tion of death, or the corporatization of medicine. I find the prospect of their combined
impact to be quite disturbing. See Scofield, supra note 12. In each instance, however,
one observes a fairly radical shift in attitudes and beliefs. For example, we currently
accept the concept of managed care even though we know that
[f)rom a short-term financial standpoint-which we do not suggest is the only
standpoint that an HMO is likely to have-the HMO's incentive is to keep
you healthy if it can but if you get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a
healthy state involving few medical expenses, to let you die as quickly and
cheaply as possible.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th Cir.
1995). The present acceptance of the corporatization of medicine is a far cry from the
law's earlier response. See Parker v. Board of Dental Exam'rs, 14 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1932).
31. There is at least some evidence suggesting that many Americans want and
need access to the sort of care that enables them to live better lives, and not simply to
have better deaths. See INSTITUTE OF MED., ALLIED HEALTH SERVICES: AVOIDING
CRISES (1989); INSTITUTE OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING
HOMES (1986); INSTITUTE OF MED., THE SECOND FIFTY YEARS: PROMOTING HEALTH
AND PREVENTING DISABILITY (1992).
32. In criticizing the move to legalize physician-assisted suicide, at least one phy
sician has interpreted what patients are saying a bit differently:
Too many people have seen their friends and relatives endure needless suffer
ing at the hands of their doctors. The best response we physicians can make to
the euthanasia movement is to provide better terminal care. We must reject
the technological imperative that compels us to use whatever treatments are
available, regardless of whether they are likely to offer our patients genuine
benefit. We should seek better forms of pain control and should not wait until
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well demonstrated by the Lilliputian dispute about whether patients
have a right to medically futile treatment,33 a debate that is con
nected to the physician-assisted suicide debate.34 If patients had a
right to treatment, we would be arguing over whether that right to
treatment does or should extend to the right to medically futile
treatment. Instead, one of the arguments in favor of denying pa
tients medically futile treatment is that they have no right to treat
ment in the first place. 35
No matter how one looks at it, patients lack positive rights
when it comes to health care, which is why physician-assisted sui
cide's advocates have to pull a rabbit out of their metaphysical hat
to concoct the notion that patients have a limited right to the sort of
"treatment" that will end their lives, but not the sort of treatment
that will better their lives.36 One has to wonder what patients
would say if they were given the choice between a health care sys
tem that would give them a better life and one that would give them
a faster death.37
patients are moribund before referring them to a hospice. Above all, we must
recognize that dying is a part of life ....
Robert I. Misbin, Physicians' Aid in Dying, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1307,1311 (1991)
(endnote omitted).
33. The literature on medical futility is almost as vast as the literature on physi
cian-assisted suicide. See generally Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Nancy S. Jecker,
WRONG MEDICINE: DocroRS, PATIENTS, AND FUTILE TREATMENf (1995); Tom Tom
linson & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264 JAMA 1276
(1990).
34. See Scofield, Exposing Some Myths About Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra
note 5, at 486 n22.
35. See Keith Shiner, Note, Medical Futility: A Futile Concept?, 53 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 803, 837-39 (1996) (noting the distinction between negative and positive rights);
id. at 838 (observing that "[e]ven if autonomy implies a right of access to care, it may
not provide a legal right to futile care.").
36. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Compassion in Dying:
No magician-not David Copperfield, not even Harry Houdini~n pro
duce a rabbit from a hat unless the rabbit is in the hat to begin with. More
over, if a hat does not contain such an animal, a magician cannot claim that
anything he is able to produce from it is in fact a rabbit, no matter how sincere
he may be or how great his forensic skills. All of this has something to do with
basic physics.
. . . Maybe some of us ... would like to see this rabbit in the hat because
we believe it's a nice rabbit ... but we do not get to change the Constitution
any more than we get to change physics.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1446-47 (9th Cir.) (Trott, J., dissent
ing), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997).
37. "[A]t a time when many millions of Americans lack adequate health care and
Congress has refused to do much about it, 'it would be ironic if the judiciary selected
physician-assisted suicide as the one health care right that deserves constitutional sta
tus.'" Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET.
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To overcome this difficulty, physician-assisted suicide's advo
cates perform a metaphysical sleight of hand,38 and add the abor
tion cases to the treatment refusal cases. In some respects, this is a
more appealing formula, since it ties the notion that physicians may
make end-of-life decisions to the perception that they can render
positive assistance in order to terminate human life. Although ap
pealing this formulation cannot withstand scrutiny either.
First, if the belief that a fetus is not a person is fundamental to
Roe v. Wade's39 holding-that abortion is not murder-then unless
we are willing to believe that the dying are not persons, Roe does
not help us here. If it is not the nature of the human life, but the
nature of the medical intervention that supports the argument, the
matter remains just as problematic. Although physician-assisted su
icide and abortion resemble each other, in that each results in the
termination of a human life,40 they are not identical interventions.
Whereas physician-assisted suicide expedites what would hap
pen if nature ran its course, abortion prevents nature from running
its course. Crude though it may be to speak explicitly, dying pa
tients die anyway, but pregnant women do not abort anyway. Un
less they abort spontaneously, women give birth. However much
physician-assisted suicide and abortion may seem to be the same,
they could not be more different in terms of their impact on what
would happen were nature's course not altered technologically.
To the extent that physician-assisted suicide expedites the nat
urally occurring process of dying, the most analogous intervention
in the area of reproduction is the caesarean section. Having mediMERCY L. REv. 735, 769 (1995) (quoting Robert A. Burt, Death Made Too Easy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at AI5).
38. See Compassion in Dying, 85 F.3d at 1447 (Trott, J., dissenting) ("[P]ulling a
nonexistent liberty interest out of thin constitutional air" amounts to "simply constitu
tional sleight of hand. ").
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Interestingly, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress argue that the abortion
cases protect a woman's right of privacy from state interference, while acknowledging
that "[m]any people thought that the Court had concomitantly recognized a positive
right in its early [abortion] decisions, namely a right to receive aid and assistance."
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 27, at 73. If a negative is an individual's right to
be let alone, it strains credibility to suggest that a woman's right to an abortion is a right
to be let alone, since physician forbearance will not result in the termination of a preg
nancy. It is more reasonable to argue that the Court stated that the states could not,
through criminal prosecution, prevent women from exercising this right (Le., from seek
ing medical assistance to terminate a pregnancy). Thereafter, the Court set limits on
this positive right by holding that the government was not required to fUnd it. That the
Court felt the need to contain this right lends further credence to the idea that the right
is positive, not negative in nature.
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calized how we come into the world, physicians now wish to medi~
calize how we leave it.41 Given the troubled history of caesarean
sections, we oUght to wonder whether physician~assisted suicide will
be any better for all patients than caesarean sections have been for
women, or whether it will simply free patients of the difficulties na~
ture creates in order for them to face the difficulties that technology
creates.42 If so, medicalizing death may turn out to be as poor an
idea as medicalizing birth has become.43
Finally, there is at least one fundamental and undeniable dif~
ference between abortion and physician~assisted suicide. It is possi~
ble to avoid pregnancy, but impossible to avoid mortality. Some of
us are fertile and can become pregnant; each of us is born mortal
and will die. Pregnancy is a temporarily and voluntarily (one
hopes) acquired condition; mortality is a lifelong condition that is
thrust upon us. Through contraception, sterilization, and absti
nence, one can reasonably hope to avoid pregnancy; there is no
prophylaxis for death. One can no more prevent death from occur
ring than one can abstain from being mortal. In fact, the only way
to avoid the unwanted condition of being mortal is to never have
been born alive. Thus, whatever physician-assisted suicide may be,
it is neither prophylactic nor curative relief to the physical condition
of being mortal. This means that it can only be some kind of thera
peutic response to the psychological state of mind created by the
knowledge that we are mortal. 44 If we could and would examine
41. Thus, a recent suggestion to improve the care of dying patients takes the "sys
tems" approach, arguing that medicine needs to restructure its approach to the dying
process as it already has to the process of childbirth. See Franklin G. Miller & Joseph J.
Fins, A Proposal to Restructure Hospital Care for Dying Patients, 334 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1740 (1996).
42. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
43. See BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIDRE ENGUSH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150
YEARS OF ADVICE TO WOMEN (1978); Roger Freeman, Intrapartum Fetal Monitoring
A Disappointing Story, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 624 (1990); Veronika E.B. Kolder et al.,
Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192 (1987); Lawrence
J. Nelson & Nancy Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Woman: Life,
Liberty, and Law in Conflict, 259 JAMA 1060 (1988); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in
the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court Ordered Caesareans, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1951
(1986); Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599
(1986).
44. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE: LIVING WITH
MORTALITY (1993). As Dr. Callahan eloquently observes:
The care of the dying has remained a kind of open moral wound in our health
care system, bedeviling us for decades now, full of hopeful initiatives that do
not quite work out, court cases that only give way to further cases, and moral
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why we are so troubled by mortality45 we would be better situated
to assess whether legalizing killing is a reasonable and prudent re
sponse to being mortal. For now, such an examination seems be
yond us. 46
How incongruous it is to combine the treatment refusal and the
abortion cases becomes clearer if we examine the limitations that
physician-assisted suicide's advocates are willing to place on their
"new" (and not-so-new) right-to-die. For one thing, they expect to
limit this right to competent, terminally ill, adults. Whether the
right to physician-assisted suicide owes its origins to the right to
refuse treatment or to the right to an abortion, there is little reason
to believe that this position can or will withstand legal scrutiny. As
the right to refuse treatment extends to the incompetent, the chron
ically ill, and to mature and emancipated minors,47 this new right to
die may not be limited although its advocates wish it so. And be
cause the right to refuse treatment and the right to undergo an
abortion also extend to the mentally retarded and the mentally dis
abled,48 it is difficult to see how the state can be successful at cate
gorically denying incompetent patients the legalized right to
physician-assisted suicide that competent patients would enjoy.
Similarly, to the extent that waiting periods and second opin
ions can and have been successfully challenged in the abortion con
text as substantial obstacles that impose an undue burden on an
individual's right to choose, one must assume that they can and will
solutions that seem to require still further moral solutions to clear up the
problems created by the earlier ones.
Cultures that live by the values of self-realization and self-mastery are not
especially good at dying, at submitting to those experiences where freedom
ends and biological fate begins.. " Their strong side is Promethean ambition:
the defiance and transcendence of fate. . . . Their weak side is submitting to
the inevitable.
Daniel Callahan, Frustrated Mastery: The Cultural Context of Death in America, 163
W.J. MEo. 226,229 (1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Michael Ignatieff, Modern Dy
ing, THE NEW REPUBUC, Dec. 26,1988, at 32).
45. See Bauman, supra note 12, at 129-60.
46. See Scofield, supra note 12, passim.
47. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1990); In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d
633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); see also In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987); Roddy v. Volunteer Med.
Clinic, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
48. See, e.g., In re Estate of D.W., 481 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); In re Jane
A., 629 N.E.2d 1337 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); In re Moe, 579 N.E.2d 682 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991); D.R. v. Daughters of Miriam Ctr. for the Aged, 589 A.2d 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1990); In re Barbara c., 474 N.Y.S.2d 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); In re Jane Doe,
533 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1987).
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be in the physician-assisted suicide context as well. 49 Yet, physi
cian-assisted suicide's advocates seem willing to write into their leg
islation the very sort of restrictions that right-to-die and abortion
advocates traditionally have opposed, adding one more contradic
tion to the already noted contradictions that surround this
movement.
That physician-assisted suicide's advocates must commit so
many contradictions, and resort to such odd twists and turns in the
course of arguing that physician-assisted suicide naturally and logi
cally "fits" into the values that underlie how we live and die, sug
gests that the fit is both contrived and forced. I now wish to
develop more fully the notion that the fit may not be nearly as good
as physician-assisted suicide's advocates would have us believe.
There are several ways to demonstrate that physician-assisted
suicide does violence to traditional notions about the prohibition
against the wrongful taking of a human life. We could, for instance,
compare and contrast decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment
and decisions about physician-assisted suicide, in terms of classic
notions of actus reus, mens rea, cause in fact, and proximate cause.
Through such analysis, we would see that the courts are trying to
integrate life-sustaining technology into society in order to recon
cile decisions about using and not using such technology with tradi
tional concepts of wrongful taking of human life,50 while at the
49. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 2 HEALlH LAW 494-96 (1995); George J. An
nas, When Procedures Limit Rights: From Quinlan to Conroy, HAsTINGS CrR. REp.,
Apr. 1985, at 24. Because physicians routinely complain about being over-regulated, it
is ironic that they are so welcoming of regulation here. See Ttrnothy E. Quill et aI., Care
of the Hopelessly IlL' Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 N.
ENG. J. MED. 1380 (1992).
50. Central to this integration and reconciliation is the observation that advances
in medicine and medical technology, because they enable lives to be artificially pro
longed, render the traditional "year-and-a-day" rule in homicides anachronistic. See In
re Saul S., 213 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Snipe, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972); United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211 (D.C. 1987); Jones v.
Dugger, 518 So.2d 295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Cross, 401 S.E.2d 510 (Ga.
1991); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 409 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1980); State v. Young, 372 A.2d
1117 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), rev'd, 390 A.2d 556 (N.J. 1978); State v.
Gabehart, 836 P.2d 102 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Vance, 403 S.E.2d 495 (N.C.
1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 166 A.2d 501 (Pa. 1960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104
(R.I. 1987); see also State v. Brown, 318 A.2d 257 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (acknowl
edging need for change but observing that change must be legislative); People v. Ste
venson, 331 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. 1982) (same); State v. Edwards, 701 P.2d 508 (Wash.
1985) (acknowledging need for Change, but disallowing ex post facto application). But
see United States v. Chase, 18 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that change
may be warranted, but observing that change must come from Congress or by decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court). Advances in medicine and medical technology have also
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same time preserving those concepts for use in instances where
treatment is wrongfully terminated or the conduct in question is a
form of homicide as traditionally defined. 51 Admittedly, this opens
the door to difficult questions of causation for both criminal52 and
civi153 cases. While a fine distinction separates letting someone die
from killing them,54 the distinction does exist.55
forced the courts to determine whether the conviction for an attempted murder pre
cludes a subsequent prosecution for murder if and when the victim's life is saved, but
the victim later dies for reasons having to do with the permanent nature of the wounds
suffered in the original assault. See People v. Harding, 506 N.W.2d 482 (Mich. 1993).
It is precisely because medical technology alters the natural timing of events, and
places the timing of death somewhat within the discretion of human judgment that the
question of whether someone has died at the right time, as well as for the right reasons
and in the right manner, is central to decisions at the end of life. See Sandra Segal
Ikuta, Dying at the Right Time: A Critical Legal Theory Approach to Timing-of-Death
Issues,5 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (1989). That we are allowed to "hasten" some deaths does
not mean that we may hasten death in any manner or for any reasons we can imagine.
51. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729-30 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834
(1997); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790,821-24 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997); see also LAW REFORM
CoMM'N OF CANADA, EUTIIANASIA, AIDING SUICIDE AND CESSATION OF TREATMENT
(1983); LAW REFORM CoMM'N OF CANADA, MEDICAL TREATMENT AND CRIMINAL
LAW 29-37, 51-73 (1980); George J. Annas, Medicine, Death, and the Criminal Law, 333
NEW ENG. J. MED. 527 (1995); Leonard H. Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing Treat
ment: The Role of the Criminal Law, 15 L. MED. & HEAL1H CARE 231 (1987-88).
52. See Jones v. United States, No. SA-82-CA-346, 1985 WL 3487 (W.O. Tex.
Apr. 17,1985); United States v. Varraso, 21 M.J. 129 (C.M.A. 1985); United States v.
Gomez, 15 M.J. 954 (A.C.M.R. 1983); State v. Olson, 435 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. 1989);
State v. Meints, 322 N.W.2d 809 (Neb. 1982); People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y.
1984); Commonwealth v. Kostra, 502 A.2d 1287 (pa. Super. Ct. 1985); State v. Ruane,
912 S.W.2d 766 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986).
53. See Kay v. Fairview Riverside Hosp., 531 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995);
Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992).
54. Professor Glanville Williams notes that a physician who furnishes poison
(such as sleeping pills) for the purpose of enabling a patient to commit suicide is techni
cally guilty of abetting a murder. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE
AND 1HE CRIMINAL LAw 319-20 (1957). Professor Williams does not deny that such
conduct runs contrary to the criminal law, but argues that it should not do so. Even his
proposal would not decriminalize assisted suicide, but would create a defense to this
crime where none currently exists. See id. at 339-46. The mere fact that a change in the
law must occur in order to accommodate physician-assisted suicide stands in stark con
trast to the ability of the courts to integrate decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment
into existing criminal and tort law concerns without having to re-write the law at all.
55. See Will Cartwright, Killing and Letting Die: A Defensible Distinction, 52
BRIT. MED. BULL. 354 (1996). Although decisions to forgo treatment seem to resemble
physician-assisted suicide when one gets into decisions to forgo ventilator support,
when drugs are used to prevent agonal breathing, a resemblance is not an identity.
Most anesthesiologists can attest to the fact that an acknowledged, acceptable side ef
fect is not the same as intended direct effect. See Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Roger
G. Spragg, Ethical Decisions in Discontinuing Mechanical Ventilation, 318 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 984 (1988); Robyn S. Shapiro, Liability Issues in the Management of Pain, 9 J.
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Instead of simply arguing, as critics of the Ninth and Second
Circuit decisions have done, that there is a genuine legal or factual
distinction between the resultant death when one forgoes life-sus
taining treatment and the death caused by physician-assisted sui
cide, I intend to ask whether the conclusion they have drawn
withstands scrutiny once one moves beyond the limited framework
within which the courts elected to analyze the question. Even if it
may be true that knowing how and of what someone has died is
inconsequential from the constitutional perspective, there is a body
of case-law that regards it as legally and factually important.
The overwhelming majority of those cases come from death
benefits litigation. A vast body of case law, dealing with testamen
tary claims,56 life insurance,57 mortgage and homeowners insurPAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 146 (1994); William C. Wilson et aI., Ordering and Adminis
tration of Sedatives and Analgesics During the Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Sup
port from CritiCIJlly III Patients, 267 JAMA 949 (1992); see also Robert D. Truog &
Charles B. Berde, Pain, Euthanasia, and Anesthesiologists, 78 ANESTHESIOLOGY 353
(1993) (suggesting that anesthesiologists may be asked to consult on cases if physician
assisted suicide is legalized). But see Albert R. Jonsen, To Help the Dying Die-A New
Duty for Anesthesiologists?, 78 ANESTHESIOLOGY 225 (1993) (arguing that such a role
lies beyond the proper practice of anesthesiology). There is a difference between using
analgesics in a manner that is careful, careless, or reckless in light of the risk involved,
and using analgesics with the intention of bringing about the consequence of death. See
KAREN L. POSNER ET AL., Professional Liability, Risk Management, and Quality Im
provement, in CLINICAL ANESTHESIA 93-100 (Paul G. Barash et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997);
Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas, III, Pain Relief, Acceleration of Death, and
Criminal Law, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 102 (1996). Risking death is one thing;
intending death is something else.
Are we to believe that in order to prevent undue killing, we must stop attending to
undue suffering? That is to say, in order to eliminate the possibility that analgesics
hasten death when used to prevent agonal breathing, are we to cease using them alto
gether and require patients who wish to forgo ventilation to do so knowing full well that
they will have to experience suffocation?
56. See Cerro Gordo Charity v. Firemen's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 819 F.2d 1471
(8th Cir. 1987); John Alden Life Ins. Co. v. Doe, 658 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. W. Va. 1987);
Davis v. Continental Cas. Co., 560 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Miss. 1983); State Farm Life Ins.
Co. v. Pearce, 286 Cal. Rptr. 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Lunsford v. Western States Life
Ins., 908 P.2d 79 (Colo. 1989); Estate of Tedrow v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d
195 (Iowa 1997); Bean v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 589 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990).
57. See Todd v. A.I.G. Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995); Arnold v. Met
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1992); Sims v. Monumental Gen. Ins. Co.,
960 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992); Houchens v. American Home Assurance Co., 927 F.2d 163
(4th Cir. 1991); Royal v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 86-2056,1987 WL 30597 (4th
Cir. Dec. 28, 1987); Smith v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., Nos. 86-5761, 86-5786, 1987 WL
36123 (6th Cir. June 22,1987); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 749
F.2d 694 (11th Cir. 1985); Sigler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir.
1981); International Underwriters, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084 (4th Cir. 1981);
Harris v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Bateman v.

332

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:317

ance,58 workers' compensation,59 automobile insurance,60 health
Equitable Variable Life Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Parker v. Danaher
Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Ark. 1994); Ferguson v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., No.
87-2432-0, 1991 WL 33523 (0. Kan. Feb. 28, 1991); Arnold v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., No. 89-3521, 1991 WL 405188 (S.D. III. June 13, 1991), affd, 970 F.2d 360 (7th Cir.
1992); Clinard v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. 88 CIV. 4444 (MBM) , 1990 WL 93634
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1990), affd, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991); Omara v. Metropolitan Ins.
Co., No. 88 C 7858, 1989 WL 121289 (N.D. III. Oct. 5, 1989); Wachovia Bank & liust
Co. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 660 F. Supp. 328 (M.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd, 836 F.2d 548 (4th
Cir. 1987); Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Schaffer, 660 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Mo. 1987), affd in
part rev'd in part, 853 F.2d 591 (8th Cir. 1988); In re International Horizons, Inc., 28
B.R. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Davis v. Continental Gas Co., 560 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Miss.
1983); Wilson v. Colonial Penn Life Ins. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Minn. 1978); Mal
com v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584 (Cal. O. App. 1992);
Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 187 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Cal. O. App. 1982), vacated, 696 P.2d
1308 (Cal. 1985); C.M. Life Ins. Co. v. Ortega, 562 So. 2d 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Buck v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. O. App. 1989); Kirk v. Financial
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 369 N.E.2d 340 (Ill. App. O. 1977), rev'd, 389 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 1978);
Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Franko, 486 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. O. App. 1985); Evans v.
National Life Accident Ins. Co., 467 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. O. App. 1984); Evans v. Provi
dent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 815 P.2d 550 (Kan. 1991); Benoit v. Speight, 432 So. 2d
1114 (La. O. App. 1983); Brindis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 560 N.E.2d 722 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1990); Mizra v. Maccabees Life & Annuity Co., 466 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. O. App.
1991); Varley v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 664 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. O. App. 1984); Gar
mon v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. O. App. 1981); Sciaudone v.
Steuk, 512 A.2d 1108 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J.); Cole v. Combined Ins. Co., 480 A.2d 178
(N.H. 1984) (Souter, J.); Estate of Galloway v. Guaranty Income Life Ins. Co., 725 P.2d
827 (N.M. 1986); Schelberger v. Eastern Sav. Bank, 60 N.Y.2d 506 (N.Y. 1983); Drain v.
United Servs. Life Ins. Co., 354 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. O. App. 1987); Chepke v. Lutheran
Bhd., 660 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio O. App. 1995); Fehring v. Universal Fidelity Life Ins. Co.,
721 P.2d 796 (Okla. 1986); Hatfield v. Empire Gen. Life Ins. Co., 748 P.2d 152 (Or. Ct.
App. 1988); Bair v. Fourhman, 442 A.2d 35 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982); Fortney v. Mutual
of Omaha Ins. Co., No. 106, 1986 WL 4588 (Tenn. O. App. Apr. 18, 1986); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. McLaughlin, 380 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1964); Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins.
Co. v. Morrison, 745 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988, writ denied); Southern Farm Bu
reau Life Ins. Co. v. Dettle, 707 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986, no writ); First Conti
nental Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hanner, 658 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983, no
writ); Smith v. Tennessee Life Ins. Co., 618 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. O. App. 1981, no writ);
Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 629 P.2d 1331 (Wash. 1981); Steele v. Lincoln Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., No. 92-3032-FT, 1993 WL 77531 (Wis. O. App. Mar. 11, 1993); Kennedy v.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. O. App. 1987).
58. See Proutsos v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., No. 94 C 1275, 1996 WL 51211 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 6, 1996); Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (Cal. O. App. 1995); West
ern Reserve Mut. Cas. Co. v. Eberhart, 610 N.E.2d 481 (Ohio O. App. 1991); O'Hara v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 574 A.2d 135 (R.I. 1990); Finch v. Tennessee Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co., 1997 WL 92073 (Tenn. O. App. Mar. 5, 1997).
59. See Johnson v. Peabody Coal Co., 26 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 1994); Meils v. North
western Bell Tel. Co., 355 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1984); Estate of Babb v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 417 So. 2d 545 (Miss. 1982); Campbell v. Young Motor Co., 684 P.2d 1101 (Mont.
1984); Neel v. State Distribs., Inc., 732 P.2d 1382 (N.M. O. App. 1986); Ahn v. Frito
Lay, Inc., 756 P.2d 40 (Or. O. App. 1988); McGill v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp.,
724 P.2d 905 (Or. O. App. 1986); Globe Sec. Sys. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd., 544 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1988); Yates v. Life Ins. Co., 353 S.E.2d 297 (S.C. O.
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insurance,61 insurance taken out on the lives of animals,62 and other
areas of the law,63 turns on knowing precisely what caused death
and the decedent's state of mind at the time of death. The fact that
the courts apply the law to the facts of these cases suggests that the
legal distinctions do matter, and that they can, may, should, and
must be made. The fact that a good many of these cases are tried,
or remanded for trial when summary judgment has been improvi
dently granted, suggests that the factual determinations do matter,
and that they can, may, should, and must be made.
By saying that these types of subtle distinctions make no differ
ence, the Second and the Ninth Circuits have either ignored or sub
silentio overturned a large body of well accepted law.64 The belief
that death by drug overdose is the same as death by natural means
is not universally shared. 65 Nor do courts agree that it is unimporApp. 1987); Lather v. Huron College, 413 N.W.2d 369 (S.D. 1987); Department of La
bor & Indus. v. Baker, 786 P.2d 821 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
60. See Bennet v. American Int'l Life Assurance Co., 1997 WL 74160 (N.D.N.Y.
1997); Western State Ins. Co. v. Kelley-Williamson, 569 N.E.2d 1289 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991); Miller v. Fann Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996);
Gomez v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 928 P.2d 1153 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); Ramharter v.
Secura Ins., 463 N.W.2d 877 (Wis. Ct. App. 1970).
61. See Casey v. Uddeholm Corp., No. 92 C 2156,1995 WL 680154 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
13, 1995); Weeks v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 655 So. 2d 590 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Fletcher
v. Life Investors Ins. Co., No. 02A01-9407CVOOI74, 1995 WL 593074 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995).
62. See Juker v. American Livestock Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 792 (Idaho 1981); Spilotro
v. Hugi, 417 N.E.2d 1066 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Bunch v. Underwriter's at Lloyd's
London, 343 So. 2d 994 (La. 1977); Ross v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 126 N.W.2d 709
(Mich. 1964); Patti v. Monarch Ins. Co., 401 N.Y.S.2d 682 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Rodgers
v. Insurance Co., 513 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, writ refd n.r.e.). For the stan
dard of care in veterinary practice, see Joseph H. King, Jr., The Standard of Care for
Veterinarians in Medical Malpractice Claims, 58 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1990). For a discus
sion of animal euthanasia, see Kristin L. Vehrs, DIsPOsmON OF WILD ANIMAlS FROM
ZoOLOGICAL PARKS AND AQUARIUMS (1993).
63. See, e.g., Stafford v. Neurological Med., Inc., 811 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1987)
(torts); In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176 (Cal. 1983) (criminal law); State v. Barrett, 445
N.W.2d 749 (Iowa 1989) (criminal law); Cherry v. Harris, 429 S.E.2d 771 (N.e. Ct. App.
1993) (torts).
64. See, e.g., State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). For exam
ple, in People v. Velez, 602 N.Y.S.2d 758 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993), the court ruled that a
patient's voluntary decision to forgo nourishment did not warrant dismissal of murder
charges against the defendant, because what made the patient dependent on artificial
nourishment was the gunshot wound inflicted by the defendant. See also People v.
Vaughan, 579 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
65. See Patch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 733 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1984); O'Toole
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1982); Wible v. Lumbennens Mut. Cas.
Co., 523 F. Supp. 236 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 681 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1982); Winters v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 433 S.E.2d 363 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Benavides v. J.e.
Penney Life Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352 (Iowa 1995); Gurnack v. John Hancock Mut. Life
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tant to decide, when, how, and what caused the decedent's death. 66
Simply put, motives and means do matter when the end result is
death.67
Because the Second and Ninth Circuits do not seem to have
Ins. Co., 550 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. 1990); Vihstadt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 187 (N.M.
1985); Thout v. Harrison, No. C.A. 161, 1990 WL 27333 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 1990);
Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 787 P.2d 1 (Utah Q. App. 1990); see also Skowronek
v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Mich. 1983), affd, 754 F.2d 167
(6th Cir. 1985) (heart attack).
66. See Porter v. State, 823 S.W.2d 846 (Ark. 1992), cert. denied, 116 S. Q. 745
(1996); Carroll v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 894 P.2d 746 (Colo. 1995); Johnson v. State,
404 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. 1991); Janus v. Tarasewicz, 482 N.E.2d 418 (III. App. Ct. 1985).
67. See Donaldson v. Lundgren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that patient with fatal brain tumor has no right to be cryogenically suspended until such
time as a cure can be found). The court in Donaldson stated that:
It is one thing to take one's own life [or to forego life-sustaining treatment],
but quite another to allow a third person assisting in that suicide to be immune
from investigation by the coroner or law enforcement agencies .
. . . In the case of assisted suicides ... the state has an important interest
to ensure that people are not influenced to kill themselves. The state's interest
must prevail over the individual because of the difficulty, if not the impossibil
ity, of evaluating the motives of the assister or determining the presence of
undue influence.
Id. at 63-64.
The issue of undue influence assumes that there is an amount of influence that is or
would be acceptable. There is little reason to believe that any amount of influence
would be acceptable, considerable reason to believe that it would not be, and every
reason to believe that it is impossible to prevent patients from being influenced in
reaching these decisions. In the context of decisions about genetic counseling, regard
for the patient's moral autonomy and respect for the dark history of eugenics has led
genetic counselors to prefer non-directive to directive counseling, so as to avoid any
possibility of influencing the patient's decision. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESS.
ING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 151-57 (1994).
Notwithstanding this approach, there is considerable reason to believe that it is not
possible to be non-directive. See Angus Clarke, Is Non-Directive Genetic Counselling
Possible?, 338 LANCET 998 (1991) (stating that non-directive counselling is a sham be
cause of the structure of the counsellor-client encounter). But see Richard Wachbroit &
David Wasserman, Patient Autonomy and Value-Neutrality in Non-Directive Genetic
Counseling, 6 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 103 (1995) (stating that value neutrality is neither
desirable nor possible, but non-directiveness is possible). Presumably we can all agree
that physician-assisted suicide also has a dark history and that it should not be provided
under circumstances that risk compromising a patient's moral autonomy. Given that
physician values can and still do dominate end-of-life decision-making, see infra notes
72-96 and accompanying text, and the belief of two advocates of physician-assisted sui
cide that physicians generally should influence the informed consent process, see
TImothy E. Quill & Howard Brody, Physician Recommendations and Patient Auton
omy: Finding a Balance Between Physician Power and Patient Choice, 125 ANN. INTER·
NAL MED. 763 (1996), there is every reason to believe that physicians may unduly
influence decisions about physician-assisted suicide. See Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo,
Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Experiment, 274 JAMA 483 (1995).
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intended to overturn this case law,68 they have created a unique test
for determining the cause of death in physician-assisted suicide
cases, and another test for all other instances. These courts are sim
ply refashioning the rules for determining what it means to cause
death, as a matter of law, if not as a matter of fact.69
68. State courts take varying approaches to the question of life insurance recov
ery in the event of suicide. See Tortuya v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 92-16693,
1994 WL 192331 (9th Cir. May 16, 1994); Meusy v. Montgomery Ward Life Ins. Co., 943
F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1991); Schachter & Co. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 801 F.2d
563 (2d Cir. 1986); Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 735 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1984); Bate
man v. Equitable Variable Life Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
69. "The opinions of the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts and the language of the
Oregon statute indicate that the drafters were reformulating the categories of permitted
and prohibited aid in dying to create a better proxy for the distinction between morally
justified and morally unjustified cases of hastening death." David Orentlicher, The Le
galization of Physician-Assisted Suicide 335 N. ENG. J. MED. 663, 666 (1996); see also
Beauchamp, supra note 27, at 1182-85. In a discussion that conflates cause-in-fact with
proximate cause, Professor Beauchamp states the matter succinctly: "[V]alue judgments
about justified and unjustified actions, rather than factual judgments, control judgments
about what constitutes 'killing' and how it differs from letting die; causal judgments do
not determine what constitutes killing and letting die. 'Killing' thus functions more as
an evaluative category than a causal category." [d. at 1183 (footnotes omitted). To
support this position, Professor Beauchamp simply refers to two works: H.L.A HART
& AM. HONORE, CAUSATION IN TIlE LAW (1959), and Samuel Gorovitz, Causal Judg
ments and Causal Explanations, 62 J. PHIL. 695 (1965). See Beauchamp, supra note 27,
at 1183 n.37. In so doing, Professor Beauchamp truncates the analysis.
While it is true that causal judgments and causal explanations can and do reflect
evaluative considerations, that is not all that these explanations include. See H.L.A
HART & ToNY HONORE, CAUSATION TN TIlE LAW 62-68 (2d ed. 1985). Before reaching
the question of whether one ought to be held responsible for the death of another, one
ordinarily must determine whether one can be held responsible for the death of an
other. If the facts are such that one cannot be said to have caused another's death, it
ordinarily makes little sense to be saying that one should not be blamed for a death one
did not cause.
This being the case, Professor Beauchamp's argument makes sense only if one as
sumes or concludes that the conduct comprehended under the phrase "physician-as
sisted suicide" can be said to have been a cause-in-fact of another'S death because it
satisfies the "but for" or the "substantial factor" tests used for deciding whether the
defendant's conduct resulted in the decedent's death. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & Aus·
TIN W. SCOTI', JR., CRIMTNAL LAW 277-301 (2d ed. 1986). Only when the trier of fact
has determined that the defendant's conduct had the effect of shortening the decedent's
life, see id. at 279-81, may the evaluative considerations of proximate cause (i.e., of
whether what was the cause of death ought or ought not be regarded as such) come into
play. See id. at 281-83. Even Professors Hart and Honore agree with this. See HART &
HONORE, supra, at 239-40.
Traditionally, the law has taken the view that it is possible for someone to kill a
dying person. "A person is liable for a homicide in accelerating the death of another
whose death would necessarily have soon occurred from an existing incurable disease,
and the degree of the homicide is not changed by the presence and effect of such dis
ease." 1 OSCAR LEROY WARREN & BASIL MICHAEL BILAs, WARREN ON HOMICIDE
§ 59, at 176 (perm. ed. 1938) (footnotes omitted). Under the Model Penal Code, it
remains possible for one to be said to have caused the death of another through the

336

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:317

To create a situation in which murder means one thing for the
purposes of physician-assisted suicide and something else for all
other purposes is as credible, and is likely to be about as enduring,
as the personhood solution was in the context of abortion. Eventu
ally, this solution will be exposed as a subterfuge, when it returns to
haunt the courts in the context of death benefits litigation; where
the courts will have to explain why the rules about causing death
work one way when the question is whether a physician should go
to jail, but another way when the question is whether a survivor
may recover death benefits. Therein lies the problem. While deci
sions to forgo life-sustaining treatment routinely do not create diffi
culties when it comes to collecting death benefits,7° decisions to use
physician-assisted suicide routinely will. However the courts ulti
mately decide to treat this matter, the fact that they must address it
means that the credibility of the solution arrived at by the Ninth
and the Second Circuits will be tarnished.71
conduct associated with assisting a suicide. See I AMERICAN LAW INST., MODEL PENAL
CoDE AND CoMMENTARIES § 2.03 (1985); II AMERICAN LAW INST., MODEL PENAL
CoDE AND CoMMENTARIES § 210.5 (1985). Even Glanville Williams, in arguing that
euthanasia and assisted suicide oUght to be condoned under the doctrine of legal neces
sity, neither denies that the chain of physical causation is absent nor asserts that what
counts as killing is simply a matter of evaluation. See WILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 318
26. Indeed, by arguing that necessity may be a proper defense to the charge of murder,
Professor Williams admits that the elements of the charge of murder have been made
out, since, as any law student knows, one does not and need not raise and prove a
defense until the prosecution has met its initial burden of proof. See id. at 318-20.
Similarly, the courts have, to some extent, struggled with these causation issues in
those cases where a defendant who has mortally wounded an individual contends that
the subsequent decision to forgo treatment is an intervening, superseding cause that
eliminates his liability for the decedent's demise. See United States v. Hamilton, 182 F.
Supp. 548, 550 (D.D.C. 1960); People v. Velez, 602 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1993); State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766, 774-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Thus, what
Professor Beauchamp seems to be arguing for is the contention that, as a matter of law,
the physician's conduct is not and may not be regarded as the cause of death, even
though the trier of fact might and could determine that the physician's conduct, as a
matter offact, was the cause of death. In short, Professor Beauchamp wishes to insulate
physicians from being scrutinized by juries and immunize them from being scrutinized
by prosecutors (i.e., place physicians above the law in a manner that others who en
gaged in the same conduct would not be). See Beauchamp, supra note 27, at 1182-85.
70. See 2 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 11.20 (2d ed. 1995).
71. Although this is a prediction, it's not a "hunch." It is based on the cases
referred to supra, notes 56-69, and on the fact that the model statute states that a pa
tient's decision to "use medical means of suicide to end such a patient's life in compli
ance with the applicable provisions of this Act shall not be considered suicide for the
purpose of voiding a policy on insurance on the life of such a patient." This section, in
the authors' minds, "protects patients from discrimination (including the voiding of life
insurance policies) because they have chosen to pursue assisted suicide." Baron et aI.,
supra note 23, at 23, 32.
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Thus, the Second and the Ninth Circuits have done nothing
other than create a sort of legal time bomb: a subterfuge that one
day will go off in some court's face, when it has to explain why an
act that seemed inconsequential from the constitutional or criminal
law perspective nonetheless has significant consequences from the
insurance law perspective. At that point the court will either have
to overturn the insurance case law that the Second and Ninth Cir
cuits have ignored-a result not likely to be accepted by the insur
ance industry-or determine that causing death means one thing
for some purposes, and something else for other purposes, a distinc
tion likely to be lost on just about everyone. This is what comes of
trying to fit a round peg into a square hole; of invoking a subterfuge
in order to make the world seem as some think it ought to be. For
our purposes, this result is enough to suggest that the move to legal
ize physician-assisted suicide is not and cannot be what it purports
to be, a natural fit into all that has come before.
II.

PHYSICIAN-AsSISTED SUICIDE Is SOMETHING THAT

IT

CLAIMS NOT TO BE

The popular perception is that physician-assisted suicide is the
final stage of the patients' rights movement, the ultimate empower
ment of patients, fulfilling their dream of controlling death by giv
ing them the fullest possible power to determine where, how, and
when they die. The illusion that patients have been empowered by
the patients' rights movement masks a quite different reality: that
physicians continue to dominate end-of-life decision-making.72
Although it is difficult to determine how much this domination ac
counts for the persistent difficulty patients encounter in having
For one thing, the authors of the model act have cited no authority whatsoever to
support the proposition that this section of their statute has support in any case law.
For another, the question of survivors' benefits extends beyond the obvious, important,
but limited realm of life insurance. The authors, for example, do not address the ques
tion of how a state statute may govern determinations made under federal statutes. See
Johnson v. Peabody Coal Co., 26 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 1994). Unless the authors of this
model statute persuade Congress to enact it, then it is unlikely that a statute passed by
the states will be read to govern the determination of federal benefits.
72. See David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Deci
sions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992); see also Henry J. Silverman, How Decisive are Physician
Values in End-of-Life Decision-Making?, 24 CRITICAL CARE MED. 909 (1996) (stating
that studies indicate that physician values may dominate end-of-life decisions); Mildred
Z. Solomon et aI., Decisions Near the End ofLife: Professional Views on Life-Sustaining
Technology, 83 AM. J. PuB. HEAL1H 14 (1993) (providing a survey of over 1,400 doctors
and nurses showing that they are not aware of, but may be in agreement with, national
recommendations regarding end-of-life patients' rights).
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their wishes honored, there is no doubt that the medical profes
sion's inability and unwill~ngness to cede or share decision-making
authority in matters of life and death remains an obstacle to re
specting the autonomy of patients,73
To the extent that physicians refuse to cede or share authority
in end-of-life decision-making, one cannot rule out the possibility
that physician values can and will dominate decisions about physi
cian-assisted suicide.74 That the illusion of patient choice masks the
reality of physician domination is consistent with the observation
that physicians exploit the belief that they have some power over
death,75
Medicine's perception of death, and its interpretation of what
mortality means, contributes significantly to the confused state in
which we now find ourselves. While death is medicine's friend, to
the extent that physicians can exploit others' fear of death to their
own advantage, death is also medicine's enemy,76 If, when death
73. "Physician reluctance to cede decision-making authority in end-of-life deci
sions is not unexpected. If patient autonomy [were] taken seriously, the impact [would]
extend[] far beyond the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. ... [R]ecognition of
patient autonomy can be perceived as threatening to traditional concepts of medical
decision-making." OrentIicher, supra note 72, at 2103 (endnotes omitted).
74. "[M]oves toward acceptance of assisted suicide or euthanasia should be tem
pered by the possibility that physician values may prevail in these decisions. One of the
greatest concerns about permitting assisted suicide or euthanasia is that lives may be
ended without the truly voluntary participation of patients." Orentlicher, supra note
72, at 2104. Given the difficulties that medical professionals-especialIy physicians
have encountered in achieving the goal of non-directiveness in genetic counseling, there
is little reason to believe that they will be any more successful here.
Indeed, even if it were possible for physicians to discuss physician-assisted suicide
with patients without unduly influencing the decision-making process, the context
within which patients make such decisions may be sufficiently coercive to prohibit the
exercise of free choice. "[M]any persons who suffer greatly with conditions likely to
end in death are abandoned by our health care system, left to suffer without recourse.
Demands for legitimation of being killed may well reflect the coercion of the abandon
ment rather than any semblance of free choice." Greg A. Sachs et aI., Good Care of
Dying Patients: The Alternative to Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 43 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC'Y 553, 554 (1995).
75. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DocrOR AND PATIENT 213-14 (1984)
(stating that doctors may exploit patients' fear of death by implying that disobeying
orders may accelerate death); Egiide P. SeravaIIi, The Dying Patient, the PhYSician, and
the Fear of Death, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1728 (1988) (stating that physicians must
overcome fear of death and sense of defeat when facing dying patients).
76. According to George Annas, "Lewis Thomas has noted that doctors 'are as
frightened and bewildered by the act of death as everyone else.' 'Death is shocking,
dismaying, even terrifying,' Thomas has written. 'A dying patient is a kind of freak[,]
... an offense against nature itself.'" George J. Annas, Physician-Assisted Suicide
Michigan's Temporary Solution, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573, 1573 (1993) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Lewis Thomas, Dying as Failure, 447 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
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wins, medicine fails, then for so long as death never appears to have
Soc. SCI. 1 (1980»; see also Richard L. Landau & James M. Gustafson, Death is Not the
Enemy, 252 JAMA 2458 (1984) (asserting that doctors should recognize death as an
integral part of human life; disease and discomfort are the enemy). The perception of
death as the enemy prevents them from moving to an acceptance of death as a natural
event. See Jack D. McCue, The Naturalness of Dying, 273 JAMA 1039, 1040-41 (1995).
A telling example of the ingrained nature of this view of death is found in physician
discussions of music. For example, two physicians have used Mahler's Ninth Sym
phony, as a vehicle for talking about death. To one, the piece at first seems to evoke
"an open acknowledgment of death and at the same time a quiet celebration of
the tranquillity connected to the process [of dying]." LEWIS THOMAS, LATE NIGHT
THOUGHTS ON LISTENING TO MAHLER's NINTH SYMPHONY 164 (1984). This view then
yields to the sense that the symphony evokes the image of "death everywhere, the dying
of everything, the end of humanity." Id. at 165. Another physician hears "a swirling
maelstrom of discord and destruction, of violence and despair," as the music brings one
"face to face with a menacing figure whose shadowy features [are J distorted by a hatred
and loathing that [are] directed solely at me." Dan Gehlbach, MEssAGE FROM MAH
LER, 261 JAMA 104, 104 (1989).
If one believes, as these physicians evidently do, that music is a form of knowledge,
see LAWRENCE KRAMER, CLASSICAL MUSIC AND POSTMODERN KNOWLEDGE 1-32
(1995), at least in the sense that composers say something about the world from which
others can derive meaning, see generally JEAN-JACQUES NATTIEZ, MUSIC AND DIS
COURSE: TOWARD A SEMIOLOGY OF MUSIC (Carolyn Abbate trans. 1990), it may be
worth pursuing this theme a bit further to examine what it reveals about physicians,
dying, and killing.
No one disputes that Mahler's Ninth Symphony reflects his concern about mortal
ity, with which he was obsessed, especially as he approached his own death. See DER
YCK CoOKE, GUSTAV MAHLER: AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS MUSIC 3-18,114-18 (2d ed.
1988); PAUL GRIFFITHS, MODERN MUSIC 15-17 (rev. ed. 1994). Mahler's Tenth Sym
phony, however, indicates that he moved on from the despair found in the Ninth to an
acceptance of death, indicating that the sentiments expressed in the Ninth were but a
phase in the development of his outlook on death. CoOKE, supra, at 118-21. Thus,
what is interesting is that Mahler moved on, but evidently medicine has not.
In a debate where words seem to have lost all meaning, perhaps music can enable
us to appreciate the difference between dying and killing; between what it means to
accept death and what it means to try to conquer death. That can be done by compar
ing two works, Mahler's Tenth Symphony, in which he moves to an acceptance of death,
and Arnold Schoenberg's, A Survivor from Warsaw, in which he says something about
the most infamous instance of legalized killing in this century. See ARNOLD
SHOENBERG, A SURVIVOR FROM WARSAW (rev. ed. 1979). The Adagio in Mahler'S
Tenth Symphony develops to a chord that has been described as an "atonal chasm,"
GRIFFITHS, supra, at 25, a "terrifying dissonance," CoOKE, supra, at 121, and as "the
most dissonant chord in all Mahler," Jeremy Noble, Adagio from the Symphony No. 10,
found in inside cover, GUSTAV MAHLER, SYMPHONIE No.8, SYMPHONIE No. 1O-AoA
GIO, at 13 (polyGram Records 1991). "Adagio from the Symphony No. 10," in Gustav
Mahler, SYMPHONIE No. 81SYMPHONIE No. lO-ADAGIO 13 (1991), reflecting the dis
cord that death creates in life, a discord that is harmoniously and quite peacefully re
solved as the Adagio concludes. Compare Mahler's treatment of dying, see PAUL
GRIFFITHS, MODERN MUSIC AND AFTER: DIRECTIONS SINCE 1945, at 52-53 (1995), with
Schoenberg's treatment of killing, see SCHOENBERG, supra. In A Survivor from War
saw, Schoenberg "express[es] an entire culture'S outrage at Nazi brutality." UMBERTO
Eco, THE OPEN WORK 143 (1989). "[TJhe effect of A SURVIVOR is unprecedented. In
the whole history of music, there can be nothing to match the overwhelming, almost
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won, medicine will not have appeared to have failed. It's that sim
ple. These beliefs lead to the death-defying ethos that has come to
dominate American medicine.
For example, Professors Renee Fox and Judith Swazey have
described the value system that is prevalent among organ transplan
tation and artificial organ "pioneers" as follows:
This ethos includes a classically American frontier outlook: he
roic, pioneering, adventurous, optimistic, and determined. But it
also involves a bellicose, 'death is the enemy' perspective; a rescue
oriented and often zealous determination to maintain life at any
cost; and a relentless, hubris-ridden refusal to accept limits. It is
disturbing to witness, over and over, the travail and distress to
which this outlook can subject patients ... .n

If only physicians held this view, we might believe that they
somehow had simply taken over and oriented our health care sys
tem towards one goal: conquering death. As Professors Fox and
Swazey observed in an earlier work, the attitudes physicians hold
about death are reinforced by broader societal attitudes about
death.

This orientation is further strengthened by the general cultural
disposition to actively delay or prevent death whenever possible,
and by the correlative extent to which the physician's obligation
to maintain life usually comes to prevail over his responsibility to
unbearable immediacy of [these] seven harrowing minutes." CHRISTOPHER WINTLE,
WEBERN: ORCHESTRAL WORKS/SCHOENBERG: A SURVIVOR FROM WARSAW 5 (1993).
Assuming that Mahler and Schoenberg are trying to say something, what might
that be? One plausible interpretation of the Mahler piece would be that death, terri
fying disruption though it is, can be accepted and harmonized into the world. One
plausible interpretation of the Schoenberg piece would be that killing disrupts the
world in a manner that cannot lead to a peaceful or harmonious resolution. Odd
though it may seem to suggest, I recommend to anyone who doubts that there is much
difference between dying and killing to give these works a listen.
I realize, of course, that some will take umbrage at the suggestion that a piece of
music written to express outrage at Nazi brutality has something to say about physician
assisted suicide. There is some sense that health care professionals ought to heed the
lessons of Nazi Germany. See Victor W. Sidel, The Social Responsibilities of Health
Professionals: Lessons from their Role in Nazi Germany, 276 JAMA 1679 (1996), a view
with which I concur. See Scofield, supra, note 12, at 381-88.
77. REtfflE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, Leaving the Field, HASTINGS CrR. REp.,
Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 9, 10 (emphasis added); see also REtfflE C. Fox & JUDITH SWAZEY,
SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 155 (1992) ("[T]he per
sonalities ... of the chief physicians and patients involved in ... experiments were
imbued with evocative 'American story' qualities.").
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ease death.78

Taken together, ours is a society that struggles against mortality,
unable and unwilling to accept the fact that human limitations do
exist.79 Because integrating death into life presents a struggle to all
societies,so what matters is the particular nature of our response to
the knowledge that we are mortal.
Given our need to believe that we are the masters of our fate,
the arbiters of our destiny, we seem to be responding as one would
expect, in ways that are consistent with the belief that we control
death, and that death does not control US.81 Simply put, when it
comes to death, we will call the shots. Because this perspective
dominates our view of death, physicians and patients become natu
ral allies in a war against death,82 an alliance whose basic rationale
78. RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, THE CoURAGE TO FAIL: A SOCIAL
VIEW OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND DIALYSIS 379 (1978).
79. See PHIL1PPE ARIES, THE HOUR OF OUR DEAlH (Helene Weaver trans.,
1981); JOHN McMANNERS, DEAlH AND 1HE ENLIGHTENMENT (1981). Americans'
resistance against death is a cultural curiosity.
Writing about death in the United States some years ago, ... Arnold
Toynbee wryly observed that 'death is un·American, an affront to every citi
zen's inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' Toynbee
has hardly been alone in his judgment that Americans seem to have a peculiar
attitude toward death. Foreign medical visitors to our country have long spo
ken with amusement of the apparent belief of many Americans that death is
just one more disease to be conquered, a tenacious but not invincible foe.
Callahan, supra note 44, at 226 (endnote omitted).
BO. "[D]eath ... posits the most terrifying threat to the taken-for-granted realities
of everyday life. The integration of death within the paramount reality of social exist
ence is, therefore, of the greatest importance for any institutional order." PETER L.
BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CoNSTRUCTION OF REALITY 93 (1966).
81. Describing the contemporary art of dying, one observer recently noted:
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, ... the personal struggle to
deal with human dying has begun to involve a [new] alternative. Increasingly
the claim is made ... that competent patients who so choose have a moral
right, and should have a legal right, to physician intervention that deliberately
shortens the suffering involved in dying ....
. . . To the extent that patient autonomy is conceived of primarily or exclu
sively as the exercise of freedom in the form of control, and given moral plu
ralism as to the normative content of this control, patient autonomy can be
claimed to include the choice of killing oneself as just another treatment to
which subjects who are suffering in their dying can give their informed
consent.
James F. Breshnan, Contemporary Art of Dying, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOElHICS 551, 553
(1995).
82. As Dr. Callahan writes:
The idea of a managed death[] catch[es] perfectly the American spirit
... [M]anaged death is romanticized: a death that is fully under the pa
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seems to be "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." That physicians
and patients are allies does not necessarily mean, however, that
their agendas are identical. Therein lies the ultimate truth about
what motivates the trend to legalize physician-assisted suicide.
Fighting death requires practice, research, and resources to im
plement and refine the technological weaponry used to stave off
death. In medicine's war on death, no weapons combine more
technical and symbolic powers3 than do cardio-pulmonary cerebral
resuscitation (CPR) and solid organ transplantation, without which
many of medicine's miracles would be impossible. 84 Transplanta
tion, among other things, requires an adequate supply of organs;
CPR requires practice and research. The problem is that procuring
organs, practicing CPR, and engaging in resuscitation research re
quire consent, because, technically speaking, one may not remove
an organ from, practice' resuscitation on, or conduct research on
human beings without their consent. 85
The medical profession has been remarkably and successfully
creative in manipulating consent in a manner that enables it to
wage war on death by using humans as a means to that end.86 In
order to make it easier to teach physicians how to intubate patients,
for example, the medical profession presumes that recently de
ceased individuals consent to be used in this manner unless they
have explicitly stated their refusal.87 In order to engage in resusci
tient's control, beautifully orchestrated to allow a final flourishing of familial
love and reconciliatory leave-taking.... Nature does not ... provide us with
an acceptable 'natural' death. [Natural death] does not measure up to the
highest standards of accommodation to our proclaimed right of self-determi
nation or our penchant for dominating control. Thus, it must be tidied up, and
how better to manage that than through physician-assisted suicide?
Callahan, supra note 44, at 227 (endnotes omitted).
83. See Kathleen Nolan, In Death's Shadow: The Meanings of Withholding Resus
citation, HASTINGS CrR. REp., Oct.-Nov. 1987, at 9.
84. See AMERICAN HEART ASS'N, TEXTBOOK OF ADVANCED CARDIAC LIFE Sup
PORT (Richard O. Cummins ed., 3d ed. 1994); Fox & SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS, supra
note 77; PETER SAFAR & NICHOLAS G. BIRCHER, CARDIOPULMONARY CEREBRAL RE
SUSCITATION (3d ed. 1988); James T. Niemann, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 327
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1075 (1992).
85. See generally Jay Katz, The Nuremberg Code and the Nuremberg TriaL' A
Reappraisal, 276 JAMA 1662 (1996).
86. See Scofield, supra note 12, 376-81.
87. See D. Gary Benfield et aI., Teaching Intubation Skills Using Newly Deceased
Infants, 265 JAMA 2360 (1991); Kenneth V. Iserson, Law Versus Life: The Ethical Im
perative to Practice and Teach Using the Newly Dead Emergency Department Patient, 25
ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 91 (1995); James P. Orlowski et aI., The Ethics of Using
Newly Dead Patients for Teaching and Practicing Intubation Techniques, 319 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 439 (1988); see also A.D. Goldblatt, Don't Ask, Don't TelL' Practicing Mini
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tation research,88 the medical research community has persuaded
the Food and Drug Administration and the National Institutes of
Health to issue regulations under which consent may be waived. 89
Finally, increased pressure to supply more solid organs for trans
plantation has led to practices that allow solid organs to be ob
tained from non-heart-beating cadavers,90 and to proposals to
modify the rules of informed consent so that consent facilitates,
mally Invasive Resuscitation Techniques on the Newly Dead, 25 ANNALS EMERGENCY
MED. 86 (1995); Samuel J. Stratton et aL, Prospective Study of Manikin-Only Versus
Manikin and Human Subject Endotracheal Intubation Training of Paramedics, 20 AN
NALS EMERGENCY MED. 1314 (1991).
88. See Nonnan S. Abramson et aI., Clinical Trials and Cerebral Resuscitation
Research, 13 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 868 (1984); Nonnan S. Abramson et aL, De
ferred Consent: A New Approach for Resuscitation Research on Comatose Patients, 255
JAMA 2466 (1986); Nonnan S. Abramson et aL, Informed Consent in Resuscitation
Research, 246 JAMA 2828 (1981); Norman S. Abramson & Peter Safar, Deferred Con
sent: Use in Clinical Resuscitation Research, 19 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 781 (1990);
Michelle H. Biros et aL, Informed Consent in Emergency Research: Consensus State
ment from the Coalition Conference of Acute Resuscitation and Critical Care Research
ers, 273 JAMA 1283 (1995); Jason H.T. Karlawish & Jesse B. Hall, The Controversy
Over Emergency Research: A Review of the Issues and Suggestions for a Resolution, 153
AM. J. REsPIRATORY CRmCAL CARE MED. 499 (1996); Robert J. Levine, Research in
Emergency Situations: The Role of Deferred Consent, 273 JAMA 1300 (1995); Keith G.
Lurie & David Benditt, Regulated to Death: The Mauer of Informed Consent for
Human Experimentation in Emergency Resuscitation Research, 18 PACE 1443 (1995);
Charles R. McCarthy, Ethical Considerations of New Guidelines for Emergency Re
search, 153 AM. J. REsPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 507 (1996); Bruce L. Miller,
The Ethics of Cardiac Arrest Research, 22 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 118 (1993); Peter
Safar, Resuscitation Medicine Research: Quo Vadis, 27 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 542
(1996); William H. Spivey et aL, Informed Consent for Biomedical Research in Acute
Care Medicine, 20 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 1251 (1991).
89. Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,498 (1996)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56, 312, 314, 601, 812, 814 (1996»; Waiver of Infonned
Consent in Certain Emergency Research, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,531 (1996) (codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 46 (1996». Waiving a human subject's right to infonned consent was sup
ported by the following organizations: the Brain Injury Association; the National
Stroke Association; the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons; the Coalition of
Acute Resuscitation and Critical Care Researchers; Applied Research Ethics National
Association; Phannaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association; Health Industry
Manufacturers Association; the American Academy of Pediatrics; the American Heart
Association Emergency Cardiac Care Committee; the American College of Emergency
Physicians; the American Medical Association; the American College of Cardiology;
the Society of Critical Care Medicine; the National Association of EMS Physicians; the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecology; and the American College of Phy
sicians. See Protection of Human Subjects, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,498.
90. See generally PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT: THE DEBATE OVER
NON-HEART-BEATING CADAVER PROTOCOLS (Robert M. Arnold et aL eds., 1995); OR
GAN TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES (Stuart J. Youngner et al. eds.,
1996); Stuart J. Youngner & Robert M. Arnold, Ethical, Psychosocial, and Public Policy
Implications ofProcuring Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver Donors, 269 JAMA
2769 (1993).

344

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:317

rather than inhibits, the procurement of solid organs for
transplantation.91
In addition to doing what it needs to do in order to combat
death, the medical profession also needs to preserve the illusion
that it has mastered death. To do that, the medical profession re
sists the open acknowledgement that its power over death is
mythic. 92 But it also promotes patient participation and upholds
the otherwise intrusive principle of patient autonomy when doing
so is consistent with sustaining the illusion that medicine can in fact
do something about death. This explains how and why physicians
resist allowing patients to participate in decisions about treatment
that is medically futile, but welcome patient participation in the
move to legalize physician-assisted suicide. Although each trend
purports to be about respecting patients, each is about one thing
and one thing only: preserving medicine's power by conferring legal
immunity on physicians for conduct that hastens the death of
human beings.93 Thus, the medical profession is simply medicaliz
ing death under the pretext of democratizing it, dressing up as a
victory for patients what is simply a victory for doctors. 94
While the legalization of physician-assisted suicide clearly em
powers physicians, it hardly empowers patients. To the extent that
91. See generally American Med. Ass'n Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Strategies for Cadaveric Organ Procurement: Mandated Choice and Presumed Consent,
272 JAMA 809 (1994); Carl Cohen, The Case for Presumed Consent to Transplant
Human Organs After Death, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2168 (1992); P.T. Menzel,
The Moral Duty to Contribute and Its Implications for Organ Procurement Policy, 24
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2175 (1992); Aaron Spital, Mandated Choice: The Preferred
Solution to the Organ Shortage?, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2421 (1992); Aaron
Spital, The Shortage of Organs for Transplantation: Where Do We Go from Here?, 325
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1243 (1991). But see B.L. Sadler, Presumed Consent to Organ
Transplantation: A Different Perspective, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PRoc. 2174 (1992) (as
serting that the two versions of presumed consent are not viable).
It is clear that those involved in procuring organs do not always follow the niceties
of consent. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991); Perry v. Saint
Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Kan. 1995). In one instance, a
patient was sufficiently dead for physicians to ask for permission to salvage his organs,
but insufficiently dead for them to honor the parents' request that he be released for
burial. See Strachan v. J.F.K. Mem'l Hosp., 538 A.2d 346 (N.J. 1988).
92. See Giles R. Scofield, Is Consent Useful When Resuscitation Isn't? HASTINGS
CrR. REp., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 28.
93. See Sandra H. Johnson, Setting Limits on Death: A View from the United
States,5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 24, 26 (1996) ("The movement to legal
ize assistance in suicide in the United States is properly seen as a movement to provide
legal immunity to physicians engaging in the practice.").
94. See Scofield, Exposing Some Myths About Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra
note 5, at 484-86; Scofield, supra note 12.
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it enables and allows physicians to continue to exploit their power
over death, the legalization of physician-assisted suicide simply in
troduces us to a new game, albeit, a deadlier one, played according
to the same rules. Patients will need a physician's permission to
procure legally endorsed assisted suicide; and physicians can use
their discretionary power to decide for whom they will and for
whom they will not write a prescription. Patients have the power to
ask, physicians the power to grant or deny that request; new game,
same rules.
That doctors are the clear winners is further demonstrated by
the fact that what is at issue is physician-assisted suicide. If immu
nity from legal liability for what would otherwise be murder is not
the greatest power that the law can confer, I don't know what is.
Certainly, if someone other than a physician were to engage in the
same conduct, he or she would be subjected to prosecution and un
able to raise the defense of legal immunity.95
For these reasons, it is difficult to see how the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide empowers patients.96 Not only may pa
tients avail themselves of this option only if they can get a note
from their doctor, they can take advantage of it only if they are
willing to risk jeopardizing whatever insurance benefits might go to
their survivors. Therefore, legalization of physician-assisted suicide
will leave doctors as well off as they are now, and make patients
worse off than they have ever been.
III.

WHAT PHYSICIAN-AsSISTED SUICIDE CAN AND SHOULD BE

If the movement to legalize physician-assisted suicide is not
and cannot be what it purports to be, and if it is something that it
does not purport to be, then what is it? For one thing, it is not

progressive, but regressive. Instead of accepting the reality that we
95. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353 (Cal. 1992); People v. Oeaves,
280 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Adams, 683 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996); Griffith v. State, 548 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Wil
liams, 638 N.E.2d 345 (lll. App. Ct. 1994); In re Eddleston, No. C3-94-682, 1994 WL
328634 (Minn. Ct. App. July 12, 1994); State v. Sexson, 869 P.2d 301 (N.M. Ct. App.
1994); Edinburgh v. State, 896 P.2d 1176 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
96. Indeed, it is difficult to see how legalization of physician-assisted suicide em
powers individuals. If the right to determine how and when one dies is a personal right,
then why does one even have to be a patient (i.e., sick) to avail oneself of physician
assisted suicide? If it is my right, I should be able to ask for such assistance whether I
am sick or not. Because only patients can avail themselves of this option, and then only
with their physician's permission, the legalization of physician-assisted suicide has more
to do with professional than with personal autonomy.
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cannot master death, physician-assisted suicide stubbornly insists
that we can. This insistence is born of some belief that we must
master it. Whether one wishes to characterize this response as in
fantile, childish, or adolescent, it is anything but mature.
To say that the movement to legalize physician-assisted suicide
is not progressive is not to say, however, that simply opposing this
movement is any more enlightened, or that a decision reversing the
assisted suicide cases should be regarded as something of a
landmark. If the United States Supreme Court overturns the as~
sisted suicide cases, it will have prevented a bad situation from get
ting worse. That is not the same as improving the realities that
confront dying patients. Indeed, the Court will have committed the
same error that the advocates of physician-assisted suicide commit:
not hearing or heeding what patients are saying. Unless we have
heard what patients are saying, we cannot claim to have solved the
problem, no matter what result the Court reaches.97
Were we to listen seriously to patients, we would discover that
their basic complaints are as simple and reasonable as their anxiety
and anger. By and large, people want physicians who can and will
talk with and listen to them, not talk at and ignore them. They
want physicians who can and will use pain medication appropri
ately, not dreadfully and fearfully. They want life-sustaining treat
ment to be used sensibly and sensitively, and not in a manner that
locks them in for life, or that batters them against their wishes, or
that terminates them against their wishes. They want technology
that does things for them, not simply to them, and that is useful to
them instead of simply used on them. And they· want care to be
provided in a manner that does not jeopardize their physical, finan
cial, and emotional well-being. 98
Basically, patients know one thing that the rest of us seem not
to: that there is a big difference between a system of care, and a
system that cares. All that most patients increasingly encounter are
physicians who do not know them, and do not have the time, incli
nation, or opportunity to get to know them. They hear of others
who live with unremitting pain and discomfort, and about families
being dragged through the courts; pawns in someone else's struggle
97. See George l. Annas, The Promised End-Constitutional Aspects of Physi
cian-Assisted Suicide, 335 NEW ENG. l. MED. 683, 687 (1996) ("Obviously we must un
derstand the patients' problems before we can be sure that our solution will do more
good than harm.").
98. See generally Karen Donelan et aI., Whatever Happened to the Health Insur
ance Crisis in the United States? Voices from a National Survey, 276 lAMA 1346 (1996).
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to detennine what makes for a good death. In short, they see that
what awaits them is a death that is not of their own, but of someone
else's choosing. If all that awaits patients is a medicalized death
that has nothing to do with them or their values, in a society that
delivers care so that individuals are as afraid of living as they are of
dying, we should not be surprised to find patients seeking a hasty
exit.
To the extent that this is what patients complain about and
fear, the legalization of physician-assisted suicide is overkill in more
ways than one. As a matter of constitutional law (as well as a mat
ter of simple judgment), physician-assisted suicide arguably violates
the least restrictive alternative doctrine, which limits the manner in
which the state may pursue legitimate objectives; in this instance,
the objective of giving patients a "good death." As the United
States Supreme Court has stated:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental per
sonalliberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.99

If it is true that one should not swat a fly with a baseball bat, then

the mere fact that we are doing poorly when it comes to dying does
not mean that we should try to excel at killing.
Just as the least restrictive alternative doctrine obligates physi
cians to exhaust any and all possibilities before even contemplating
assisting in a suicide, it requires us as a society to exhaust any and
all other means to improve the care of the dying before we take the
most drastic step of all: altering the rules about what it means to
kill.loo Certainly the results of the recent Study to Understand
99. Shelton v. Thcker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (footnote omitted).
100. See American Med. Ass'n Council on Scientific Affairs, Good Care of the
Dying Patient, 275 JAMA 474 (1996) (recommending that the American Medical Asso
ciation encourage research into the needs of dying patients and how the healthcare
system could better serve them); Zail Berry & Joanne Lynn, Hospice Medicine, 270
JAMA 221 (1994) (arguing that the needs of the dying patient must receive a reason
able priority in political, economic, and medical discussions which will prompt the fi
nancing needed to deliver hospice services); Greg A. Sachs et aI., supra note 74; Martin
L. Smith et aI., A Good Death: Is Euthanasia the Answer?, 59 CLEVELAND CLINIC J.
MED. 99 (1992) (arguing that it is the best interest of patients, society, and health care
providers to continue the prohibition against euthanasia and to direct the attentions of
health care professionals to better pain control and psychological support of tenninally
ill patients); Lucy G. Sullivan, Euthanasia: Wrong Problem, Wrong Answer, 165 MED. J.
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Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment
(SUPPORT) lend credence to the notion that much remains to be
done in terms of the proper care of the dying. 101
Of course, such an undertaking would force us to find out why
so many Americans die "bad" instead of "good" deaths.1OO Were
we to examine this question as seriously as we should, and as assid
uously as the Constitution and good judgment require us to, we
would likely come to terms with the unpleasant realities created,
not by death, but by US.103
This would force us to admit a basic truth: Death does not dis
criminate, but we, and our health care system, surely do. Death
remains the greatest equalizer; it takes you regardless of your con
dition, age, race, sex, creed, religion, nationality, or wealth. Our
health care system, however, doles out treatment consistent with
the principle of economic apartheid on which it is so solidly based.
Sad though it is to admit, I can do no more than repeat here what I
have written and said before:
AUSTRALIA 558 (1996) (arguing that only when problem areas in euthanasia have been
clarified will we be able to see if the public really wishes to usher in the dangers for the
right to live, and that the predictable pressures on the choice to live will accompany the
legislation of euthanasia); see also NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND 1HE
LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN 1HE MEDICAL
CoNTEXT 153-81 (1994); WASHINGTON STATE MED. ASS'N, REpORT OF 1HE EXECU
TIVE CoMMl"ITEE: END OF LIFE ISSUES (1996).
Put another way, before we even consider experimenting as the Dutch are with
physician-assisted suicide, we ought to consider creating a system of health care that is
as accessible and affordable as the Dutch health care system. See Sjef Gevers, Euthana
sia: Law and Practice in the Netherlands, 52 BRIT. MED. BULL. 326 (1996)
101. See generally The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to
Improve Care for Seriously III Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses
and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591
(1995).
102. In another context, I have argued that the indiscriminate use of feeding
tubes prevents some patients from experiencing the enjoyment of having a real meal.
See Giles R. Scofield, ArtifiCial Feeding: The Least Restrictive Alternative?, 39 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC'y 1217 (1991); see also Tlnlothy O. Lipman, Enteral Nutrition and
Dying: Ethical Issues in the Termination of Enteral Nutrition in Adults, in CLINICAL
NUTRlTlON: ENTERAL AND TUBE FEEDING 588-98 (John L. Rombeau & Rolando H.
Rolandelli eds., 3d ed. 1997).
103. Of these, few are more striking than the studies which indicate that black
men living in Harlem are less likely to reach the age of 65 than are men in Bangladesh.
See Colin McCord & Harold P. Freeman, Excess Mortality in Harlem, 322 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 173 (1990). As the most recent studies indicate, "[I]ife expectancy is shorter, and
mortality rates greater, for black than for white Americans." Jing Fang et aI., The Asso
ciation Between Birthplace and Mortality from Cardiovascular Causes Among Black and
White Residents of New York City, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1545, 1545 (1996); see also
Arline T. Geronimus et aI., Excess Mortality Among Blacks and Whites in the United
States, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1552 (1996).
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We do not die equal deaths. Too many Americans die wretched
deaths because they live wretched lives-they live and die in
squalor. They are the politically, economically, and medically
disenfranchised. The moral issue of our day is not whether [we
ought to] enable or prevent a few individuals' dying in the com
fort of their homes in the presence of their private physicians.
The moral issue of the day is whether [we oUght] to do something
about our immoral system of care, in which treatment is dis
pensed according to a principle best characterized as that of eco
nomic apartheid.

Emily Friedman said it best in her remarkable essay, The Torturer's
Horse,l04 where she wrote:
The medically indigent ... represent the risk of moral rot at
the heart of our society, born of a callousness about those whose
suffering we can not see and therefore do not acknowledge .
. . . Should we continue to treat the most fragile members of
our society as strangers, we will not be acting like the torturer's
horse; we will be the torturers. lOS

Simply put, access to death is not the problem; access to health
and to health care is. If we are genuinely looking for a "bold exper
iment,"106 why don't we experiment with reforming our health care
104. Emily Friedman, The Torturer's Horse, 261 JAMA 1481 (1989). The title for
the essay comes from W.H. Auden's poem, Musee des Beaux Arts, in which Auden
describes the world of the haves and the have-nots, which Ms. Friedman then weaves
into her essay, as folIows:
About suffering they were never wrong,
The Old Masters; how well they understood
Its human position; how it takes place
While someone else is eating or opening a window or just walking dully
along...
They never forgot
That even the dreadful martyrdom must run its course
Anyhow in a comer, some untidy spot
Where the dogs go on with their doggy life, and the torturer's horse
Scratches its innocent behind on a tree.
Most insured Americans are like the torturer's horse, minding their own
business while somewhere, in another part of the forest, the uninsured poor
suffer. Some of this is the product of ignorance, but some of it is the product
of bigotry. The poor, the nonwhite, the homeless, the oddball, the mad, and
(increasingly) the very elderly are simply not considered as valuable as the
white, employed, middle-class stereotype of American privilege.
Id. at 1481.
105. Id. at 1482. Of course, if we legalize physician-assisted suicide, we will be
murderers as well as torturers.
106. Alpers & Lo, supra note 67.
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system so that it is affordable, accessible, and equitable? That
would be something new and different.
The last time I was invited to discuss physician-assisted suicide,
I said that "the fuss about physician-assisted suicide is about as im
portant as re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic."lo7 I now
believe that I picked the right image, but the wrong ship. Again,
Emily Friedman said it best in a more recent discussion of the quest
for universal access to affordable care. lOS Arguing that "the moral
imperative is to help Americans ... understand that [the] problem
[of limited access] affects all of us, every day-and that it is getting
worse,"109 Ms. Friedman notes:
Historically, it takes a long time for the people of this coun
try to understand and embrace the moral cause; but in time, they
do. It is thus our responsibility to keep sending the message: We
all pay for the uninsured, in the form of epidemics, avoidable life
time disabilities, crippled and closed hospitals and clinics, expen
sive last-minute care, misallocation of resources, and wasted lives
and money.110

Asking herself how long we should keep "sending the message,"
she responds plainly:
The answer comes from the words of the captain of a boat that
was attempting to rescue passengers from the sinking ship An
drea Doria in 1956, in heavy seas. He was hailed by another res
cue boat captain who was returning to shore, abandoning the
drowning passengers, who warned him that he would be in dan
ger if he continued to try to save them. The first captain shouted
back, "We ain't leaving 'til we don't hear no more screaming."
So must it be with those of us who understand that until all
of us know we will be cared for when we are sick, none of us is
truly safe. lll

Having said all this, what else is left to say?
107. Scofield, Exposing Some Myths About Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra
note 5, at 474.
.
108. See Emily Friedman, Welcome to Year 83,273 JAMA 256 (1995). The title
comes from her observation that Theodore Roosevelt, in 1912, became the first presi
dential candidate to run for office on a platform that included universal access to health
care. [d. at 256.
109. [d. at 257.
110.
111.

[d.
[d. Of course, physician-assisted suicide certainly can silence patients, but

whether silencing patients is the same as "stopping the screaming" is another question.
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CONCLUSION

Societies define themselves not by what they choose, but by
how they choose, especially when the choice has to do with suffer
ing. ll2 Choosing responsibly requires choosing prudently and hon
estly. Therefore we must acknowledge and balance the
consequences of legalizing physician-assisted suicide against the
consequences of not doing so.
If physician-assisted suicide is not legalized, one likely conse
quence will be the existence of some undue suffering, for those
whose pain and suffering cannot be medically addressed and for
whom physician-assisted suicide seems the only real option. If, on
the other hand, physician-assisted suicide is legalized, one likely
consequence will be some degree of undue killing, in those in
stances where the choosing was not as careful as it ought to have
been. 113
If the real choice we face is between living in a world in which
there is undue suffering, and one in which there is undue killing,
can it be so difficult for us to choose? We can and should do some
thing about undue suffering; sometimes, we can even undo it.
When it comes to undue killing, the situation is different. There is
no way to undo killing. The only way to avoid undue killing is to
not get into the business of doing killing in the first place. However
112. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt discuss suffering as follows:
We cannot know why the world suffers. But we can know how the world de
cides that suffering shall come to some persons and not to others. While the
world permits sufferers to be chosen, something beyond their agony is earned,
something even beyond the satisfaction of the world's needs and desires. For
it is in the choosing that enduring societies preserve or destroy those values
that suffering and necessity expose. In this way societies are defined, for it is
by the values that are foregone no less than by those that are preserved at
tremendous cost that we know a society's character.
CALABRESI & BOBBl'IT, supra note 25, at 17.
113. The fact that we find the risk of undue killing acceptable in the area of capi
tal punishment, however, suggests that we may find that risk acceptable in the context
of physician-assisted suicide also. See generally Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty
in America: Yesterday and Today, 95 DICK. L. REv. 759 (1991); Samuel R. Gross, The
Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L.
REv. 469 (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence ofDeath: Evolving Standards
for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978); Susan
Raeker-Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme
Court's Evolving Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
455 (1996); Austin Sarat, Bearing Witness and Writing History in the Struggle Against
Capital Punishment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUM. 451 (1996); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on 1Wo Decades of Constitutional Regula
tion of Capital Punishment. 109 HARV. L. REv. 355 (1995).
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unfortunate undue suffering is, it is an acceptable consequence in a
way that undue killing can never be. The remorse we will feel
about undue suffering pales before the regret we will feel about
undue killing.
To choose honestly, however, we must come to terms not only
with what it means to suffer, but also with what it means to be mor
tal: truths about ourselves that we seem unable and unwilling to
admit. If we could see that accepting our mortality is not, need not,
and should not be akin to succumbing or acquiescing to fate, we
might also see that even though we cannot alter the facts of death,
we can alter the conditions of life. If, as the saying goes, "Living
well is the best revenge," then instead of trying to improve on
death, why don't we try to improve on life? How? By dedicating
ourselves to the task of assuring that each of us and all of us receive
sensible care from sensitive providers, care that enables us to enjoy
rich, meaningfu1lives from the moment we are born until the mo
ment that we die. Were we to do that, we might find that the secret
of having a good death lies in having lived a good life, and that if we
succeed at taking good care of the living, we will have succeeded at
taking good care of the dying as well. Although I know we can and
believe we should do this, I continue to wonder when and whether
we will.

